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Foreword 
 
This report is written within an Action network called Local Public Service Reforms: An 
International Comparison (LocRef), which is part of COST (European Cooperation in Science 
and Technology), which in turn is a long term international network funded by EU FP7.  The 
LocRef network started in 2013 and consists of more than 100 researchers from close to 30 
countries. The network is coordinated by a Management Committee, which is headed by Prof. 
Dr Sabine Kuhlmann (Chair), University of Potsdam and Geert Bouckaert (Vice-Chair), 
University of Leuven (http://www.uni-potsdam.de/ls-kuhlmann/cost/cost.html).  
The research organised in four Working Groups with specific research purpose, but the 
research is guided by three overall questions: 
(A) What institutional changes can be investigated and what is the explanation of 
(varying) reform degrees form a comparative perspective? 
(B) What are the drivers/causes of reform activities, who are the promoters/stakeholders 
and what implementation strategies do they follow? 
(C) How can the (intended and un-intended) reform effects be evaluated? 
 
More specifically, this report is a country report within Work Group I, which deals with 
issues related to “External (Post-) NPM”. The WG focuses on NPM-driven externalizations of 
local services to private or non-profit providers (contracting-out, functional/asset 
privatization, corporatization, competitive tendering). It also assesses the more recent Post-
NPM reforms that are targeted towards re-municipalization and re-integration of previously 
externalized local functions. 
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Between hierarchy, market and networks  
The case of public utility and care for the elderly in Sweden 
 
Stig Montin1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: The local government system in Sweden 
 
The aim of this country report is to provide an overall view of changes in the regulation and 
management of the “hard” and “soft” service sectors in Swedish municipalities in recent 
decades. Hard services are traditional public utilities and soft services are constituted by 
eldercare. A description of the local government system and a short historical background are 
provided by way of introduction, together with a definition of concepts used. A separate 
description of the development of public utilities and eldercare is subsequently provided, and 
finally a number of conclusions are drawn. 
The term “local government” (kommun) includes municipalities and county councils, which 
overlap but which have different areas of responsibility. Municipalities are thus not 
subordinated to county councils. While municipalities are responsible for a wide range of 
activities, the principal responsibility of county councils is primary health care and hospital 
care (about 90% of the budget). In four cases (Västra Götaland, Skåne, Halland and Gotland), 
the county councils are called regional councils. The difference between the regional councils 
and the other county councils is that the former have more wide-ranging responsibilities. In 
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addition to primary health care and hospital care, they are responsible for regional 
development and infrastructure planning. 
Local self-government in Sweden is mainly defined through a “general powers” clause in the 
Local Government Act (LGA, 1991:900): municipalities and county councils must 
themselves attend to matters of general concern which are related to the municipality’s or 
county council’s area, or with their members and which are not to be the sole responsibility of 
the state, another municipality, another county council or some other body. (LGA, Ch. 2, 
Section 1). 
There has always been a strong principle of local self-government in Sweden and it is given 
further emphasis in the constitution. However, whilst local self-government is a principle, it 
has never been clearly defined. It is basically delegated state-power. What local self-
government actually means at a specific historical moment is a negotiated order, mainly 
between the political parties and between central government and the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). Viewed over time, the major tendency is towards 
decentralisation, however, occasionally and within specific policy areas, central government 
control has simultaneously increased. Over a period of several years a certain practice has 
developed, which has recently been constitutionalised. Accordingly, in the revised 
constitution of 2010, a chapter has been added with six articles concerning local authorities, 
including both self-government and restrictions on it (Instrument of Government, Ch. 14). In 
addition to the principles stated in the constitution, the Planning and Building Act states that 
“planning the use of land and water areas is a matter for the municipality” (The Planning and 
Building Act, Law 1987:10), which is generally referred to as “planning monopoly”. 
On the other hand, it states that detailed rules concerning responsibilities are laid down in law, 
that “local authorities may be obliged to contribute to costs incurred by other local authorities 
if necessary to achieve an equal financial base” (a system of financial equalisation), and more 
generally that “regulations regarding grounds for change in the division of the realm into local 
authorities are laid down in law” (Instrument of Government, Ch. 14). 
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2. A broad historical background 
 
Expressed differently, the Swedish system is characterised by a strong central state and a 
system of strong local government. First, it has roots related to the principle of the Rechtstaat 
and the introduction of civil and political rights. The principle of the Rechtstaat holds that 
three demands have to be fulfilled. First, citizens must enjoy a number of fundamental 
freedoms and rights. Second, even the highest authority is bound by the rule of law. In 
Sweden this is articulated in the Instrument of Government by the statement “public authority 
is exercised under the rule of law”. Third, public power has to be organised according to the 
principle of division of power (Mattson & Petersson, 2004). 
Second, many historians claim that Swedish democracy has its roots in how everyday matters 
were dealt with in the countryside. However, local government had no impact on the 
institutionalisation of the Swedish form of government (Strandberg 2004: 188). The role of 
local government became far more important during the development of the welfare state, 
especially post-WW II. 
Development of the welfare state mainly started in the 1930s, and has been described in terms 
of “rationalistic planning”, “the era of the great programmes”, ”the strong state”, ”the 
corporative state” and ”to put life in order”. The political ambition was to construct a good 
society on the basis of enlightenment, science, and democracy (Hermansson 2003). 
Throughout the 20
th
 century institutional capacity was increased in order to solve societal 
problems. In general, reforms have been framed and implemented within what has been 
regarded as a representative chain of command characterised by a representative democracy 
based on political parties, and a public administration based on the rule of law and 
effectiveness. In reality, the framing and implementation of welfare reforms has been 
influenced by interest organisations, mainly regarded as “representatives of society”. Hence, 
this form of corporatism has generally not been regarded as a democratic problem.  
The expansion of welfare state services in Sweden can be reconceptualised as the expansion 
of municipal welfare (Lidström 2011). Since the 1950s, local authorities (municipalities and 
county councils) have been more or less regarded as the most important institutions when it 
comes to implementing social and educational policies. This does not mean that the autonomy 
of local government throughout this period has been as strong as it is now. Several 
decentralisation reforms have made the municipalities more autonomous.  
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Two boundary reforms have been implemented since the 1950s (1952 and 1974). The number 
of municipalities was reduced from about 2,500 in 1951 to 278 in 1974. Since the 1980s a 
number of municipalities have been partitioned into two or more units with the result that in 
2014 there are 290 municipalities.  
The growth of local authorities as welfare institutions can be measured in a number of ways. 
At its height during the 1960s and 1970s, the annual growth in volume was around seven to 
nine per cent. With an index of 100 in 1970, state consumption rose to about 120 in 1980 and 
130 in 1991 (and has declined since then) and municipal consumption rose to 145 in 1980 and 
180 in 1991. 1992 was the first year in modern times when the volume declined. Today, 
municipal and county council expenditure accounts for about 25 per cent of GDP, a figure 
which has remained roughly the same since 1980. 
Mainly as a response to the amalgamation reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and the growth in 
resources, a period of decentralisation measures was instituted, with the experiment of “free 
municipalities” during the 1980s and subsequently giving municipalities the freedom to 
organise political and administrative functions (which was laid down in the new local 
government act in 1991), decentralisation of responsibility for primary and secondary 
education and the transformation of central government subsidies (from earmarked subsidies 
to general subsidies) in 1993.  
 
2.1 Conceptualisation 
By way of classifying the institutional change that has taken place during the last decades 
within the areas of public utility and eldercare, a common distinction between hierarchy, 
market and networks can be used (cf. Meuleman 2008). “Hierarchy” refers to when central 
government institutions apply formal authority in relation to local government institutions or 
activities that are under local government responsibility. An example of “hard” control is 
when an agency uses sanctions in order to make improvements. Central government 
management of local government in Sweden is mainly “soft”, based on the principle of local 
self-government. “Market” refers to a situation where public services are contracted out using 
public procurement, or when consumers of public services can choose between different 
providers (voucher system). This does not imply an absence of central government 
management and control. For instance, numerous rules are applied in order to facilitate 
 5 
 
“competition neutrality”. “Network” mainly refers to horizontal collaboration between 
interdependent actors related to a certain policy field. Inter-municipal collaboration is one 
example and another example is when public and private actors collaborate in framing the 
quality of services. All three types of coordinating mechanisms can be used simultaneously 
and during some periods one can be emphasised more than others. 
The driving forces that lie behind the interaction between these modes of governance are of 
various kinds. One important factor often used to explain and justify a transition towards a 
more market-like public administration is the increasing lack of public resources. The 
argument is that new forms of incentives and management are necessary. However, lack of 
resources as such does not explain a specific approach to reform; ideas of governance are also 
important. Such ideas are imported, adjusted or produced within a general logic of changes in 
how to coordinate complex organisations (Bouckaert et al 2010). Put simply, when central 
coordinating units, whether central government or local government, find themselves 
overloaded by issues, it is natural to decentralise or delegate functions and decision-making. 
This is what happened in the 1980s and in the early 1990s. The distribution of functions and 
responsibilities, and thus risk-taking, was driven further by the introduction of NPM. 
Logically, when coordinating actors perceive a tendency for public administration and the 
organisation of public welfare to fragment, they try to increase central control again. This is 
what has happened since the turn of the century by placing greater emphasis on scrutinizing 
activities (evaluations, inspections, etc.). Hence, the development of new combinations of 
instruments based on hierarchy, market and networks.  
 
  
 6 
 
3. Changes since the 1980s 
 
A new era of reforms can be identified since the late 1980s. The overall direction has been 
towards adaptation of market mechanisms as drivers for development (purchaser-provider 
split, competition, customer choice, privatisation and performance control), but also increased 
demand for citizen involvement in handling complex policy matters and inter-municipal 
cooperation in order to cope with operational and strategic matters. Local government 
responsibility for welfare, education, economic development and broader issues related to 
sustainable development has increased, but so has central government control and monitoring, 
for example, with regard to public procurement, education and health care. Several changes 
that have taken place in legislation directed at municipalities and county councils can be 
viewed as adaptations to EU legislation on the free movement of money, people, goods and 
services. In contrast to some other EU countries, there is no wave of “re-municipalisation” 
taking place in relation to either “hard” or “soft” services. However, the issue has been put on 
the agenda, especially concerning healthcare, social services and education. Politicians and 
think-tank’s from the political left in particular are arguing in favour of a re-municipalisation 
of eldercare (or at least more control of private providers), but also that the state should take 
back the operational responsibility for public train transport and track maintenance. 
3.1 Public utilities 
Various concepts are used to define “public services” or “municipal services”. For instance, a 
distinction is made within EU legislation between “services of general interest” (SGI) and 
“services of general economic interest” (SGEI). As there is no explicit definition of what to be 
regarded as SGEI in the EU legislation, member states can make their own definitions of what 
kind of services are to be included. Typical SGEI services at the municipal level might be 
transport, water distribution, energy provision and electricity distribution. A public service 
can be withdrawn from EU competition rules if there are “market failures”, that is if it is 
regarded as not possible for market actors to deliver the services. The Swedish government 
have been very restrictive in defining services in this way. TEU vocabulary is not actually 
used. The argument has been that services in general (public utilities as well as social 
services) should not be provided by just one actor (monopoly), but by competing actors in the 
market. For example, provision of public housing (bostadsförsörjning) is not defined as SGEI 
in Swedish law (Govt. White Paper. 2009/10:185, p. 28). 
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Public utilities including municipal housing, water and sewage services, property 
management and private company services have to a large extent been transformed into 
municipal companies acting in the market. Municipally-owned companies (based on private 
law) have always represented an important way of handling a range of local services, such as 
water supply, energy distribution, property companies, public transport (limited companies). 
Municipal companies are organised nationally within specific sectors. For instance, water and 
sewage is a municipal responsibility and is nationally organised within a specific sector 
organisation called The Swedish Water & Wastewater Association, SWWA (Svenskt Vatten). 
SWWA was set up by a number of municipalities in 1962.  
There are several reasons to establish a municipally-owned company. For example, they can 
act more flexibly and less publicly than an authority based on public law. However 
discussions are continuously taking place concerning issues such as transparency and political 
accountability related to these companies. Changes have been made in the Local Government 
Act with the aim of enabling greater fulfilment of democratic values. In the mid-1990s the 
constitutional principle of public access to official documents (Offentlighetsprincipen) 
became applicable to municipally-owned companies (more than 50 per cent ownership). The 
level of transparency in the companies is thus similar to that of ordinary public authorities. 
Viewed over time, the number of municipal companies was reduced during the 1970s. In the 
subsequent period, corporatisation has increased in two waves. In an initial wave from the 
late-1980s to the mid-1990s a couple of hundred companies were established. The second 
wave started in 2007 and there are now about 1,600 municipal companies. Most companies 
are situated in larger cities and are mainly involved in private corporate services and property 
management. In terms of employment, the largest companies are in the areas of energy and 
water supply. The total turnover for municipal companies increased by 27 per cent between 
2004 and 2009. 
Municipal companies can be seen as “hybrid organisations”. This means that they are 
supposed to act in a business-like manner in a competitive environment and simultaneously 
contribute to the public interest (allmänintresse). According to the LGA, they cannot be set up 
principally to make a profit, but they are allowed to make a reasonable surplus (the principle 
of prime cost). This twofold mission often leads to conflicting goals, which, for instance, is 
obviously the case within municipal housing companies. According to legislation from 2010 
the companies are expected to act in the name of public interest, but also act according to 
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“business-like principles”. What this actually means is that they are not allowed to increase 
the rent of an apartment above what it is worth (the principle of the utility value), but they are 
also expected to maximize their profit. This can be viewed as an adaption of EU rules on state 
support and implies that politicians have a double role: on the one hand, representing the 
public, and on the other hand representing the company as a profit-seeking actor.  
Municipal companies are actors in markets along with private companies, in the electricity 
distribution sector for example. Since the liberalisation of the Swedish electricity market in 
1996, profit-maximizing companies carry the main responsibility for distribution and 
investment in new electricity generation. Electricity consumers have 122 different distributors 
to choose from (see, for example, www.elskling.se). The largest companies are E.ON (owned 
by a large German company), Vattenfall (owned by the Swedish state) and FORTUM, which 
together distribute electricity to more than 50 per cent of all customers. The rest of the 
distribution companies largely consist of municipal companies. To some extent this high 
concentration of ownership in the market has been regarded as inadequate 
(Energimyndigheten 2006; Fridolfsson & Tangerås 2011). Distribution of electricity 
consequently consists of a combination of a very small number of dominant profit-
maximizing companies with a large number of small municipal companies.  
Another, somewhat similar, case is waste management, which also combines public and 
private actors. A privately owned system of extended producer responsibilities (EPR) is 
responsible for collecting and processing specific waste streams such as packaging and 
electronic equipment and batteries. Household waste management (which is not included in 
the EPR system) is a municipal responsibility (Corvellec et al 2013). Municipalities decide 
themselves how it is organised, as self-administration by municipal companies (independently 
or jointly with other municipalities), joint boards or municipal associations. Two or more 
municipalities can jointly own one company, which means that municipalities collaborate on 
improvements and coordinate their policies (Lindqvist 2013). Contracted private companies 
perform the bulk of the waste collection, but municipal companies do most of the waste 
treatment (recycling, biological treatment, energy recovery, incineration and landfill) 
(www.skl.se). Of the more than 220 waste companies in the Swedish market, ten predominate 
(five municipal companies and five private companies). Waste management is often 
connected to the municipal district heating system, which means that household waste is often 
used as fuel for district heating (Corvellec et al 2013).  
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In 2012 a government commission (Government Commission Report 2012:56) proposed a 
new structure of responsibilities in waste management. The main proposal is for 
municipalities to take over the responsibility for collection of packaging, newspaper and 
waste paper for recycling from the producers (producers of goods are responsible for 
recycling packaging and waste paper etc.). However, the Swedish Competition Authority 
(Konkurrensverket), among other bodies, considered that the proposal would end up in a 
monopoly situation (www.konkurrensverket.se). This proposal can be interpreted as a kind of 
“re-municipalisation” of the waste collection operation, however, in August 2014 the Alliance 
Government decided to maintain the system of private collection of waste for recycling 
arguing that this would stimulate further improvement of recycling based on economic 
incentives rather than public authority.  
Another area of policy that is undergoing change is public transport. In 2008 the sector 
organisations (the Swedish Transport Association, the Swedish Bus and Coach Federation, 
the Swedish Taxi Association, the Association of Swedish Train Operation Companies and 
SALAR) joined together as a “Partnership to double public transport” with the aim of 
doubling the volume of travel by public transport during the period 2006-2020 in order to 
contribute to a more sustainable development. The policy instruments consist of a 
combination of strengthening formal authority, market mechanisms and inter-municipal 
collaboration. Municipalities and municipal companies are engaged on “both sides” of the 
purchaser/provider split. In accordance with new legislation from 2012 (the Public Transport 
Act), there is a regional public transport authority tasked with making strategic political 
decisions on the development of public transport based on a large-scale overview and better 
coordination with other types of social development (Swedish Transport Association 2013). 
This new authority has its base within local and regional government and can be a region, a 
county council, a regional association or an inter-municipal association. The regional public 
transport authorities do not, however, purchase actual transport. This function still lies with 
municipal transport companies. A market for commercial bus traffic within regions has 
simultaneously opened up, enabling for-profit bus companies to set up bus services anywhere.  
3.1.2 Re-municipalisation? 
A research report commissioned by the European Federation of Public Service Unions 
(EPSU) shows that there is a tendency towards the “re-municipalisation” of public utilities in 
a number of EU countries (PSIRU 2012). This is not (yet) the case in Sweden. For many 
years there has been a mixture of hierarchical and market-oriented institutional arrangements. 
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Municipal companies are themselves hybrids of formal authority and market operations. 
During recent decades the combination of formal authority and marketization has become 
even more prominent, exemplified by the electricity market and the public transport sector. In 
this sense it can be argued that NPM it still a major influence on reform. In line with the 
concepts used by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) for example, the state of local public utilities in 
Sweden can be seen as a combination of NPM and the “Neo-Weberian state”.  
3.2 Eldercare 
Historically, municipal eldercare has developed out of the responsibility for arranging homes 
for old and poor people in the 17
th
 century. Modern eldercare can be dated from the 1950s, 
when municipal care at home was introduced. 
 
Eldercare services in Sweden are deemed to be provided on a universal basis, which means 
comprehensive, publicly financed and high quality services should be available for all citizens 
according to their needs rather than their ability to pay. Approximately 85 per cent of eldercare 
funding comes from municipal/county council taxes, while another 10 per cent comes from 
national taxes. What users pay only covers 5-6 per cent of the costs (Erlandsson et al 2013). For 
several decades, official eldercare policy has focused on home-based care (home help services). 
Special accommodation should only be considered when no other options are available, and it 
should be as home-like as possible. 
Providing care for the elderly is still ultimately a municipal responsibility. Local government’s 
overall political responsibility and accountability for private provision of public services is 
regulated in the Local Government Act (LGA) and substantive legislation consisting of the 
Social Services Act (Socialtjänslagen, SFS 2001:453) and the Medical Services Act (Hälso- 
och sjukvårdslagen), as well as regulations drawn up by national government agencies (such as 
the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, NBHW). The very idea of having 
municipalities take responsibility for different kinds of welfare functions represents local 
democratic control and a proximity between the actual service provision and those who are 
politically responsible for making the provision in accordance with local needs. This means that 
municipalities are entitled to design health and social care services for the elderly that are 
adapted to local conditions. 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, municipal care for the elderly was regarded as an exclusively 
public (municipal) matter, involving public financing and provision. During the 1980s, 
decentralised administrative management in terms of increased responsibility for managers at 
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different levels became of prime importance in all policy areas, including eldercare. Arms-
length political control was introduced, including management by objectives (MBO), 
management by results (MBR), and purchaser/provider models. According to these models, 
politicians should be able to focus on strategic issues rather than on time-consuming day-to-day 
politics. Today nearly all municipalities have some kind of MBO/MBR, and most 
municipalities use some kind of internal contract system (sometimes still called the 
purchaser/provider model).  
Along with this internal managerialism, initiatives were gradually put in place to increase 
management autonomy by contracting out welfare services. Privatisation (contracting out) 
within care for the elderly (and the disabled) has been continuously expanded since the 1990s. 
Between 2000 and 2010, private provision of care for old and disabled people (home services 
and special accommodation) increased by approximately 12 per cent. The most extensive 
changes have taken place during the last couple of years. The proportion of all old people in 
private special accommodation was 21 per cent in 2012, compared to 14 per cent in 2007. In 
terms of hours for home help services for old people, private provision increased from 13 per 
cent in 2007 to 23 per cent in 2012 (Socialstyrelsen 2013). Private alternatives within care for 
the elderly were initially a uniquely metropolitan phenomenon (Stockholm), but they have 
gradually spread to adjacent suburbs and larger cities, and subsequently to smaller cities. 
Nevertheless, in 2012 half of all municipalities (mostly smaller ones) provided their own 
eldercare. On the other hand, some municipalities have put all eldercare into the hands of 
private providers (ESO 2014) This policy diffusion cannot be explained simply by referring to a 
right-wing political majority, but is the result of an intertwined complexity of ideological and 
economic factors and geographical proximity (Stolt & Winblad, 2009). 
Municipalities are not forced to contract out home help services or special accommodation (“in-
house”), however, if that is what they decide to do, they have to follow the rules of public 
procurement (Public Procurement Act, 2007:1091), which states that there has to be competitive 
tendering (”ex-house”). Alternatively, another piece of legislation can be used (Lagen om 
Valfrihet, LOV), which entitles service consumers to choose accredited and listed private help 
service providers. It should be noted in this respect that the rules in Sweden go beyond those 
rules required by EU Directive 2004/18 in which welfare services can be regarded as “services 
of general interest” and hence do not have to be included in a competitive system (Erlandsson et 
al, 2013, p. 28). 
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The private providers consist mainly of fairly large for-profit companies. Privatization of 
eldercare in Sweden thus represents a shift in policy from non-profit municipal organisations 
towards for-profit global venture companies (Stolt et al 2011). In this context it should be 
mentioned that when “freedom of choice” was launched nationally by the right-wing 
government as an important reform to enhance quality in health care for old people, it was 
assumed that there would be a large number of non-profit organisations providing elder care. 
However, due to the fact that it is hard to provide any precise quality criteria, the price of the 
services becomes the most important criteria and smaller companies and non-profit 
organisations are not able to compete with the big ones, which have thus far turned a rather 
good profit in selling care to municipalities. 
In order to make it easier for municipalities and county councils to introduce consumer choice 
instead of outsourcing, a new legislation called “system of choice” was introduced in 2009 
(LOV, Lagen om valfrihet, SFS 2008:962; Konkurrensverket 2012). It was also argued that this 
new legislation would encourage smaller and not for-profit providers to join the eldercare 
market. System of choice entails a procedure where the individual is entitled to choose which of 
the suppliers with which a contracting authority (municipality and county council) has approved 
and concluded a contract should perform the home-help service (Erlandsson et al, 2013). There 
are no restrictions on how many providers can be approved. This means that the providers have 
no guaranteed customers. Private service providers in accordance with LOV can supply 
supplementary services at a market price to “top up” subsidised municipal eldercare, which 
municipal providers not are allowed to do. LOV can basically be applied for all social services, 
home-based as well as residential. This legislation is compulsory for county councils but 
voluntary for municipalities. In 2014 a Government Commission suggested that all 
municipalities should be obliged to create conditions that enable users to choose between 
various providers of home-help services. Approximately 180 of the 290 municipalities had 
introduced this system in 2014. 
Market-oriented reforms within eldercare have transformed the role of local government from 
being the only provider towards a situation of being both purchasers and providers. This means 
that municipal politicians and professionals have had to develop new skills (Erlandsson et al 
2013). They have had to develop expertise in how to purchase eldercare in a market dominated 
by care companies that are in some cases actually more powerful than the municipality. They 
have also had to develop expertise in monitoring and quality control, which demands sufficient 
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resources. All in all, this has created a rather complicated system and an increase in demands 
for performance scrutiny and performance management. 
3.2.1 Performance scrutiny 
When NPM was introduced in Sweden in the 1980s, several critics remarked that too little 
emphasis was put on measuring performance. This was a period of “management by 
objectives”, however, it was generally regarded that there was a lack of relevant knowledge to 
enable politicians to make qualified and informed decisions. More information concerning the 
quality of public services was generally required. Several motives can be identified behind this: 
cost-effectiveness, political accountability, the rule of law and provision of information for 
users to make rational choices. The need for different kinds of performance measurements 
increased concurrently with increased internal delegation within local government and 
privatisation (private providers).  
Large municipalities often have an advanced system to scrutinise activities related to eldercare. 
However, several reviews suggest that there is a lack of systematic control and follow-up of the 
activities of private providers in both large and small municipalities. For example, on many 
occasions only a small number of measurable goals have been formulated as the basis for public 
procurement of health and care, home care for elderly has not been systematically followed-up 
and there is a general lack of resources and knowledge concerning the responsibility for control 
and follow-up within eldercare (Swedish Government Official Report 2013:53).  
During the 1990s a number of cases of “poor conditions” within eldercare were highlighted in 
the mass media, in Government Commissions and at the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(NBHW). These included quality deficiencies, lack of coordination between municipalities and 
county councils and inadequate treatment. One particular event had a substantial impact. This 
was when in 1997 an employee (Sarah Wägnert) drew public attention to significantly 
unsatisfactory conditions at a specific residential unit. This report from below became so 
significant that in 2001 new legislation concerning employees the right and obligation of 
employees to report bad conditions was named after her (Lex Sarah). Besides this example of 
“hard” control, new “soft” control was also introduced, including action plans and development 
plans. According to an analysis of new control measures based on performance scrutiny, these 
measures were mainly soft and one explanation might be that central government tried to 
balance between on the one hand increased central control in order to cope with unsatisfactory 
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conditions, and on the other hand the distribution of responsibility between central and local 
government (Feltenius 2010).  
At the same time, with eldercare issues high on the national agenda in the 1990s, municipalities 
started to develop horizontal benchmarking activities with the support of the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), the national membership organisation 
for municipalities and county councils/regions. For instance, in the late 1990s some 20 
municipalities formed a “comparing quality network”, which grew to involve around 50 
municipalities by 2001, subsequently becoming a national project with almost 30 different local 
networks including nearly 200 municipalities. The national project was formally concluded in 
2010, however, several results and measures were collected into a national database. This was 
just one example of horizontal networking to develop eldercare and, according to comparative 
studies, this Swedish way of developing performance measurement and benchmarking was 
more voluntary and horizontal than in other countries (Kuhlmann 2010; Kuhlmann & Jäkel 
2013). This is one way to interpret the development of performance management, but more 
recent top-down processes should also be taken into account. 
There are a considerable number of public agencies and quasi-public organisations involved in 
performance scrutiny of eldercare. First of all there is the Swedish National Board of Health and 
Welfare (NBHW), a government agency with a wide range of activities 
(www.socialstyrelsen.se). These include monitoring, evaluation, developing standards and 
exercising supervision. In June 2013, the supervisory and scrutinising activities were 
streamlined and put into a new authority (The Inspectorate of Health and Social Care, IHSC). 
There are also a number of “meta-scrutinisers” which assess the success and failure of 
scrutinizing activities, such as the Swedish Agency for Health and Carer Services Analysis 
(Myndigheten för vårdanalys), the Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen), the Institute 
for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy, the Swedish Agency for Public 
Management (Statskontoret) and the Expert Group for Public Economics and Government 
Committees (ESO).  
Supervision (tillsyn), which is conducted by IHSC within health care and social care, has 
traditionally been focused on monitoring how public and private providers perform in relation 
to legislation and regulation. In general, supervision consists of various forms of inspections in 
order to ensure compliance with the law and to safeguard the rights of the individual. In the case 
of eldercare, compliance with the law mainly refers to the Social Services Act 
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(Socialtjänslagen, SFS 2001:453), but also to the Medical Services Act (Hälso- och 
sjukvårdslagen). The Social Services Act states that the aim of eldercare is to ensure that old 
people live with “dignity and a sense of well-being”, which is referred to as a national 
“fundamental value” (värdegrund). It also states that the elderly must be able to live and lead 
independent lives in safe conditions and have an active and meaningful existence in the 
company of others. According to NBHW, it is important that the staff within eldercare (public 
and private providers) have equivalent training so that the care will be characterised by national 
equivalence (Socialstyrelsen 2011a). 
Over a period of three years (2010-2012), NBHW conducted annual inspections of eldercare 
ordered by the central government. Each year a specific focus was chosen and a summary report 
was published in 2013. These three years of inspections ordered by the Government were 
operational, concentrating on activities which had previously been highlighted as defective or 
characterised by poor conditions. A report from 2012 states that 80 per cent of homes designed 
for the elderly (special accommodations) that were inspected did not fulfil the requisite 
demands based on legislation, regulations and instructions (Socialstyrelsen 2012). 
The three years of inspections stipulated by the Government can be seen as an inspection 
process of its own, but it is also part of a process of scrutinising eldercare called “Regional and 
local comparisons” (RLC) or “open comparisons” (öppna jämförelser) (Lindgren 2012). RLC 
within eldercare consists of three documents produced annually: the Elder Guide (since 2008), 
old people’s perceptions of elder care (since 2009) and health- and social care for the elderly 
(since 2010). The latter is produced in collaboration with the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR). It states that in 2014 a national system of quality measures 
and criteria will be developed. SALAR is putting a lot of effort into getting municipalities and 
county councils to develop their own scrutinizing activities while also participating in 
developing national standards for quality. 
In order to produce a fuller picture of the expansion of scrutiny activities, some other actors also 
have to be taken into account. There are two important organisations. Firstly, the Association of 
Private Care Providers (founded in 1976) is an employer organisation and an industry 
organisation for private providers of health and care. One of the main objectives of the 
organisation is to strive for freedom of choice and to demonstrate to the public the importance 
of variety in care provision. The association makes frequent contributions to discussions 
concerning quality and quality measures within health and care (www.vardforetagarna.se). The 
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second is the Swedish Standards Institute (SIS), a membership organisation for standard setting 
within different industries. SIS was commissioned in 2012 to develop Swedish quality 
standards for social care and health care for the elderly (homes for old people and home 
services). These organisations are not directly involved in performance measurements but are 
important as providers of norms and standards concerning quality measures.  
As private providers have increased within care for the elderly, their interest organisations have 
also become highly involved in trying to frame the quality of elderly care. For instance, the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) appointed an “independent expert 
group”, which was tasked with providing “guidelines for increased quality” within health care, 
education and social care (including elderly care). In addition, a closely related private 
employer organisation (the Association of Private Care Providers) has provided a “model for 
following up and accounting for quality within elderly care”. However, a close look at the 
documents presented by these two organisations reveals that they do not live up to the 
expectation of delivering clear definitions or criteria for quality. As in the case of similar 
discussions within SALAR and the NBHW, “quality” is an elusive concept, which tends to lead 
to measuring what is quantitatively measurable. It is quite interesting that one of the documents 
(from Svenskt Näringsliv) contains an image illustrating “measuring quality” (within health care 
and social services) which shows someone using a calliper to measure the exact circumference 
of a metal object. 
To sum up, a web of different public and private actors are increasingly involved in scrutinising 
elder care. The most important of these are central government agencies, implying that the 
focus is mainly on national values in relation to equivalence, but the focus is also increasingly 
being placed on how to facilitate market functions. There are also strong indications that the 
scrutiny system is strengthening itself; when bodies find that eldercare is not fulfilling the 
required quality, they promote further development of the scrutinizing process. 
3.2.3 Re-municipalisation? 
Re-municipalisation of eldercare in Sweden is taking place sporadically, however, there does 
not (yet) seem to be a wave of re-municipalisation of previously privatised (contracted out) 
eldercare. As there is no systematic overview of re-municipalisation, it is only possible to 
highlight specific cases where for different reasons municipalities have withdrawn the 
management of special accommodation from private providers. A simple Google search gives 
the impression that there have been a growing number of cases where individual special 
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accommodation has been taken back from Attendo, Carema and other private providers. 
Examples can be found in Arboga, Umeå, Järfälla, Stockholm, Malmö, Motala, Norrköping, 
Kalmar, Linköping, Gävle, Växjö and Örebro. Only in very few cases has the withdrawal taken 
place during the contract period. There are also a few cases were municipalities have withdrawn 
LOV-options, i.e. replaced private providers with municipal providers of home help services. 
After the election in September 2014, the minority government consisting of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Green Party announced an “end to profit-making within 
welfare”, which means that private welfare and education companies should not be 
allowed to have profit-making as an aim. All surpluses should be put back into the 
business. Moreover, it is suggested that municipalities should have the power to veto the 
establishment of “free schools” and that county councils should have the power to veto the 
establishment of private home care and health clinics. All of this is supposed to bring 
“order” into the welfare system. However, the idea of an end to profit-making and a local 
government veto will first be investigated over a period of two years. A Government 
White Paper is planned for completion in 2016, and it will subsequently have to be passed 
in the Swedish Parliament, which might be problematic because the alliance parties have 
clearly stated that they will not support it. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
The political system in Sweden comprises a strong state and strong local government. 
Decentralisation has been a trademark of developments since the 1970s. However, the 
increasing use of the market as a coordinating instrument since the late 1980s has tended to 
fragment the system into and a mixture of continuing marketization combined with 
hierarchical state coordination. Networks are also important in the two policy fields of public 
utility and eldercare, at the local as well as the national level. There is no obvious 
development towards re-municipalisation in Sweden, but there are some minor tendencies that 
might transpire to be of political importance in the future, especially in the case of welfare.  
With respect to public utility, there are several hybrids between hierarchy (formal authority) 
and market. Municipal companies, which are the main providers of services in several sectors, 
are to be seen as institutionalised hybrid organisations in this sense. However, in order to 
adapt to EU-legislation, some adjustments have to be made in national legislation to ensure 
that municipalities are not accused of illicit state support. 
Traditionally, eldercare can be seen as a “non-centralised” municipal responsibility, which 
has turned into a market regime since the 1990s. When it comes to the organisation of 
performance management, the development has moved from network coordination towards 
hierarchy. In the 1990s, individual municipalities entered into networks in order to compare 
and exchange knowledge about what makes good eldercare. The results of this networking 
have subsequently been converted into national standards with the aim of being applicable for 
all municipalities. In addition, national scrutinising authorities have been given greater 
powers. 
The case of eldercare shows an increasing combination of market orientation and a growing 
performance scrutiny “industry”, which can be interpreted and explained in various ways, but 
a suggestion is the following. An ideological shift regarding the classical balance between 
equality and freedom has taken place since the 1980s, which means that more weight is 
placed on the latter. It has been argued that freedom of choice is an important value and that 
competition is regarded as the most relevant instrument for achieving this objective. National 
equivalence is still an important value in this context as well, however, not in relation to the 
content of services but in relation to the formal rules of competition. Hence, two control 
systems can be distinguished. One system focused on the content of services with the aim of 
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ensuring there is a national equivalence in terms of equal access and equal quality. This 
system is based mainly on social-democratic values gradually established since the 1930s. 
The other system is focused on the forms of service delivery, i.e. freedom of choice for 
individuals and freedom of competition between service providers. This leads to tensions 
between integral and centrifugal forces.  
According to all political parties in the Swedish Parliament and across different interest 
organisations, Sweden is still regarded as a universal welfare state and the equivalence of 
social services is still an important value. When the centrifugal forces become too obvious 
there is a call for integrating mechanisms. A common concept in this context is “quality”. As 
a value, quality is similar to democracy in that it is something to which no one can actually be 
opposed. Several public authorities, interest organisations and organisations representing 
private service providers are intensively involved in finding objective and neutral quality 
indicators and measures that can be developed into a national standard for all providers. A 
generally accepted conceptualisation and operationalization of quality in eldercare is thus 
assumed to be used both as an instrument for supporting values of equivalence and also to 
legitimate private profit making. The search for neutral indicators of quality and the on-going 
institutionalisation of different systems of benchmarking, evaluation, inspections, rankings 
and other types of scrutiny models should be placed in this area of tensions between a social 
democratic value system and a liberal market value system. Sweden is simultaneously 
described as in the forefront of introducing NPM in terms of deregulating the welfare system 
by, for instance, making room for public financing of private profit making within social 
services and education, and regarded as a universal welfare state based on equality. The 
expanding “scrutinising society” can thus be seen as a logical outcome of trying to manage 
the tensions between social democratic value systems and market liberal value systems. 
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